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uncertainties facing the use of trust protectors in many states and argues
for amending the Uniform Trust Code to address these uncertainties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"A trust is an arrangement whereby one person (the trustor) transfers
property to another person or entity (the trustee) and directs the trustee to
hold the property for the benefit of another person (the beneficiary)."' These
days, trustees often have significant discretionary and administrative pow-
ers.2 The increased use of institutional trustees,3 as well as the growing so-
phistication and complexity of modern trust asset management, have in-
duced many settlors to give their trustees greater power and discretion. In
addition, many states have enacted statutes, such as the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act 4 or the Uniform Trust Code5 (UTC), that confer broad powers
upon trustees. However, vesting greater powers and discretion in trustees
can also increase the risk that a trustee will fail to carry out the settlor's in-
tent.6
1 Karen E. Boxx, Gray's Ghost-A Conversation About the Offshore Trust, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 1195, 1197 (2000).
2 See Henry J. Lischer, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to Liability?, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 486-88 (2000).
3 See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 633 (2004).
4 UNIF. TRS.' POWERS Acr § 3(c), 76 U.L.A. 689 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (identifying
twenty-five powers). As of 2004, twelve states had adopted the Uniform Act. See GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OFTRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 n.
28, (2nd ed. Supp. 2009). Other states have enacted their own laws enumerating the powers
of trustees. See id. at n. 30.
5 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816 (amended 2004 & 2005), 76 U.L.A. 627 (2006 & Supp.
2009) (listing twenty-six powers).
6 Settlors, trustees, beneficiaries, and trust protectors may be both male and female.
However, I have chosen to use male pronouns to include females for stylistic reasons. For
the same reason, I refer to trustees in the singular even though a trust may have multiple
trustees.
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One possible solution to the settlor's dilemma is the appointment of a
trust protector.7 A trust protector is a person who the settlor appoints to en-
sure that the trustee carries out the settlor's wishes.8 As discussed below, a
trust protector can play a useful role in trust administration, particularly if
the trust is a large one or is expected to last a long time. However, several
potential risks are associated with the appointment of a trust protector. First
of all, because the use of trust protectors is still relatively uncommon in the
United States, the legal landscape is largely terra incognita. The few stat-
utes that exist provide very little guidance to practitioners and case law is
virtually nonexistent. This Article discusses some of the powers that settlors
can give to trust protectors as well as some of the duties and potential liabil-
ities that may come with this position. This Article also suggests what role a
trust protector might play in connection with various types of trusts.
Part II of this Article examines the status of trust protectors in the Unit-
ed States. Part HI identifies some of the powers that a trust protector may
exercise and the sources of these powers. Part IV analyses a trust protector's
potential duties and liabilities. Part V discusses how a settlor may employ
trust protectors to achieve various goals. Finally, this Article concludes by
suggesting that the UTC be amended to explicitly recognize trust protectors
and set forth their powers and duties.
II. THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS OF TRUST PROTECTORS
The emergence of trust protectors is one of the most significant recent
developments in American trust law.9 First popularized in connection with
offshore asset protection trusts, trust protectors have a somewhat shady ped-
igree.10 However, the use of trust protectors has become more common in
trust administration in the United States."
A. Trust Protectors and Offshore Asset Protection Trusts
An asset protection trust is a self-settled spendthrift trust that is created
to insulate the settlor's property from creditors' claims.12 Until recently,
See Gregory S. Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2807, 2807 (2006).See James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection
Scheme, 102 CoM. L.J. 138, 149 (1997).
See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2807.
10 See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDozo L. REV. 2761, 2764 (2006).
11 See Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 670.
12 See Ritchie W. Taylor, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: The "Estate Planning Tool
of the Decade" or a Charlatan?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 163, 164 (1998).
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almost all American courts held that allowing settlors to thwart creditors by
making themselves the beneficiaries of self-settled spendthrift trusts was
against public policy.13 Consequently, many U.S. citizens established self-
settled trusts in foreign countries where they could take advantage of more
debtor-friendly local laws.14 Although some of these settlors were swindlers
and deadbeats, a large portion of them were physicians and other profes-
sionals who were concerned about large malpractice awards depleting their
assets. 15
Typically, the settlors of offshore asset protection trusts rely on a num-
ber of devices to protect themselves from the claims of American credi-
tors.16 These devices include antiduress clauses and flight clauses. "An anti-
duress clause prohibits [a foreign] trustee from complying with any order
imposed upon the settlor, a domestic trustee or [a] foreign trustee" by an
American court.17 A flight clause authorizes a foreign trustee "to take what-
ever actions are necessary in order to protect [trust property] against threats
of nationalization, expropriation or political instability."
Notwithstanding the many advantages of offshore asset protection
trusts, Americans who set up these trusts in foreign countries are often re-
luctant to give up all control over their assets to a foreign trustee.19 To safe-
guard against wrongdoing by the trustee, the settlors of offshore asset pro-
tection trusts rely on devices such as trust protectors and nonbinding letters
of intent. A trust protector is a trusted family member or business associate
who exercises substantial power over the foreign trustee while enabling the
settlor to defeat creditors' claims by purporting to divest himself of any
formal control over the trust.20 Nonbinding letters of intent sometimes are
used in connection with trust protectors. A nonbinding letter of intent is a
document in which the settlor advises the trustee about the disposition of
See, e.g., Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 624 F. Supp. 2d 970,975-79 (N.D. Ill. 2009);
Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1954); In re Hertsberg Inter Vivos Trust, 578
N.W.2d 289, 291 (Mich. 1998).
14 See Richard C. Ausness, The Offshore Asset Protection Trust: A Prudent Financial
Planning Device or the Last Refuge of a Scoundrel?, 45 DUQ. L. REv. 147, 152-56 (2007).
15 See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake and
Eatina It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 56-57 (1994).
See Ausness, supra note 14, at 155-56.
17 Id at 155; see also Lorenzetti, supra note 8, at 146.18 Ausness, supra note 14, at 156 (citing Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of
Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 310 (2002)).
19 See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2764.
20 See Danforth, supra note 18, at 310.
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trust property. 21 Although the trustee can ignore the settlor's wishes, the
trust protector can override the trustee's decision or even remove the trustee
22
and appoint a more cooperative successor.
Unfortunately for those who have established asset protection trusts in
foreign countries, trust protectors have not always been able to screen the
trusts from interference by hostile American courts. 23 For example, in FTC
v. Affordable Media, LLC,24 a married couple, the operators of an alleged
Ponzi scheme, established an asset protection trust in the Cook Islands.25
The couple designated themselves, along with a Cook Island domiciliary,
trustees; in addition, the defendants named themselves as trust protectors.26
When an American court ordered the settlors to repatriate assets from the
trust, the remaining trustee removed the settlors as trustees pursuant to the
trust's antiduress clause.27 The settlors then claimed that they no longer had
the power to compel the trustee to comply with the court's repatriation or-
der. However, the court observed that the settlors, in their capacity as trust
protectors, had retained the power to remove the trustee and to appoint new
trustees.29 In addition, the court noted that the settlors, acting as trust protec-
tors, could overrule the trustee's determination that the court's order consti-
tuted an event of duress. 30 Consequently, the court reasoned that the settlors,
in their role as trust protectors, retained the right to direct the foreign trustee
to repatriate the trust's assets to the United States. 3 1 When the settlors per-
sisted in their refusal to comply with the court's order, the court held them
in civil contempt and incarcerated them.32
The defendants' scheme might have worked if they had been a bit more
clever. First, they should not have acted as trustees or appointed any Ameri-
can citizen to act as a trustee of their offshore trust. Furthermore, they
should not have appointed themselves as trust protectors or appointed any-
one to that position who might be subject to the jurisdiction of an American
21 See Denise C. Brown, Caribbean Asset Protection Trust: Here Comes the Sun-
Dispelling the Dark Clouds of Controversy, 7 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 133, 134 (1998).
22 See Lorenzetti, supra note 8, at 149.
23 See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
24 Id.
25 See id. at 1242.
26 See id.
27 See id at 1232.
28 See id at 1230.
29 See id at 1242.
30 See id.
31 See id at 1243 n.13.
32 See id at 1233.
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court. Instead, they should have appointed a reliable person as trust protec-
tor who would not be subject to the jurisdiction of an American court. This
plan would have left the FTC, as well as their defrauded former clients, with
no recourse but to sue the trustees and trust protector in the Cook Islands.
B. The Status of Trust Protectors Under American Law
Over the past two decades, the use of trust protectors has become more
common in the United States. This increase began in the late 1990s when
a number of states passed laws to provide some protection to domestic self-
settled trusts against creditors' claims. 34 States modeled these domestic as-
set protection trusts after their offshore cousins, and these trusts typically
permit trust advisors or trust protectors, including the settlor, to remove
trustees or to veto proposed distributions from the trust.35 Furthermore, in
recent years, partly due to the influence of the UTC, the use of trust protec-
tors has expanded to other kinds of trusts as well.
Many states have enacted statutes that expressly or impliedly authorize
settlors to appoint trust protectors. These statutes roughly fall into three cat-
egories: (1) statutes that expressly authorize domestic asset protection trusts,
(2) statutes based on the UTC, and (3) statutes generally regulating trusts
and trust administration. Alaska enacted the first domestic asset protection
trust legislation in 1997, and Delaware quickly followed suit.36 Eleven
states presently allow the creation of domestic asset protection trusts in their
jurisdictions.37 Many of these domestic asset protection statutes expressly
See Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 670.
See Keith Adam Halpern, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: What Is Your State of
Asset Protection?, 7 FLA. ST. U. Bus. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (2008). That is not to say that
trust protectors, or something like them, were entirely unknown. One of the editors who
reviewed this article prior to publication recalled seeing a trust from the early 1900s with a
provision for a trust protector.
For a more detailed description of some of these domestic asset protection trust
statutes, see Richard W. Nenno, Planning with Domestic Asset-Protection Trusts: PartiI, 40
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 477 (2005).
36 See Paul M. Roder, Note, American Asset Protection Trusts: Alaska and Delaware
Move "Offshore" Trusts onto the Mainland, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1253, 1267-71 (1999);
Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Note, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete for the Asset
Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 831,
850-51 (1999).
See Alaska Trust Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.40.110, 13.36.035-13.36.060 (2008);
Delaware Qualified Disposition in Trust Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (2007 &
Supp. 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-505 (West 2007); Nevada Spendthrift Trust Act, NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 166.010-166.170 (LexisNexis 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D:1 to 18
(LexisNexis Cum. Supp. 2009); Oklahoma Family Wealth Preservation Trust Act, OKLA.
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38allow settlors to appoint and remove trust advisors and trust protectors.
Furthermore, in some cases, domestic asset protection trusts specifically
enumerate the powers of trust protectors.39
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UTC.40
Section 808(b) of the UTC declares that the settlor may authorize a third
party to oversee the trustees or make certain decisions about the manage-
ment or distribution of trust assets.4 1 Although the statutory text does not
mention trust protectors by name,42 the comment to that section states that
"[s]ubsections (b)-(d) ratify the use of trust protectors and trust advisors."4
Finally, a few states expressly refer to trust protectors in their general trust
administration legislation."
Only fourteen states expressly recognize trust protectors by statute, al-
though a number of other states have implicitly recognized them by adopt-
ing the UTC. The remaining states have not acknowledged the existence of
trust protectors, even by implication. Furthermore, many of the states that
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 10-18 (West Supp. 2009); Rhode Island Qualified Dispositions in
Trust Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1 to 18-9.2-7 (2003 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 55-16-1 to 16-17 (Supp. 2008); Tennessee Investment Services Act of 2007, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-16-101 to -112 (2007 & Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 25-6-14
(2007); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-1-505,4-10-510 to 4-10-523 (2009). For a comparison of the
principal features of these various domestic asset protection laws, see David G. Shaftel,
Com rison of the Twelve Domestic Asset Protection Statutes, 34 ACTEC J. 293 (2009).
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §13.36.370(a) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2007
& Supp. 2008); R.I. Gen. Laws § 18-9.2-2(9)(iii)(B) (2003 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-1B-1(2) (2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(e)(iv) (2007);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a) (2009).
39 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(11) (2007 & Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564-D:1 to 18 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 18-9.2-1 to 18-9.2-7
(2003 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-6 (2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE
ANN. 25-6-14(2)(e)(iv) (2007); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a) (2009).
Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. See MARY F. RADFORD, GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OFTRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 994n.
17 (3d ed. 2006).
41 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
42 See Robert T. McLean Revocable Trust v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 786,789 n. 3 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009).
43 See UNIF. TRUST CODE, § 808 cmt (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
44 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818 (Supp. 2008); IDAHO. CODE ANN. § 15-
7-501 (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7103(n) (effective April 1, 2010).
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do mention trust protectors in their statutes say nothing about the specific
nature of their powers and duties. Therefore, the question arises whether
courts can, or should, affirm the validity of trust protectors and identify their
powers and duties in the absence of statutory authorization. So far, almost
none have done so.
Ironically, the only appellate court to discuss the legal status of trust
protectors in any depth expressed doubt about whether trust protectors
should be recognized at all. That case was Robert T. McLean Irrevocable
Trust v. Davis,45 decided by a Missouri intermediate appellate court in 2009.
The case, discussed in more detail below, was primarily concerned with the
liability of a trust protector for failing to prevent the trustees of a special
needs trust from depleting the trust's assets. 6 However, in a concurring
opinion, Judge John Parrish expressed concern that the trust had designated
a trust protector "when that term has not been previously accepted or other-
wise defined by statute or court opinions of this state."47 Judge Parrish sug-
gested that courts should exercise caution when evaluating the validity of
trusts that designate "obligations or rights of a nature not theretofore estab-
lished by statute or prior judicial determination." 4 8 He also concluded that
"using procedures other than those time-proven in the law is something that
should not be encouraged" in the area of trust administration because any
disputes that subsequently arise will require lengthy and expensive litigation
to resolve. 49 Nevertheless, after stating his reservations about the settlor's
designation of a trust protector in the absence of judicial or statutory recog-
nition, Judge Parrish went on to consider whether the defendant trust protec-
tor owed a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary or the trust.50
As discussed above, a number of states either expressly mention trust
protectors by name in their statutes or implicitly recognize trust protectors
by virtue of their adoption of the UTC. However, in the remaining states,
the legal status of trust protectors is uncertain. As Judge Parrish's concur-
ring opinion in Davis suggests, courts are probably reluctant to create a new
body of trust law out of whole cloth. Conversely, courts may also be disin-
clined to condemn the out of hand use of trust protectors if practitioners are
routinely drafting trust instruments that make use of them. Thus, courts may
be willing to uphold the use of trust protectors in the absence of express
45 283 S.W.3d 786.
Id at 788.
47 Id. at 795 (Parrish, J., concurring).
48
49Id
See id at 795-96.
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statutory recognition on the theory that trust provisions should be consid-
ered presumptively valid and effective as long as the provision is not ob-
viously contrary to public policy. Consequently, these courts may be willing
to uphold any powers that the settlor gives the trust protector in the trust
instrument. Likewise, such courts should also enforce any duties or limita-
tions that the settlor chooses to impose upon the trust protector in the trust.
Nevertheless, for states that have not already done so, enacting legislation
that recognizes the legal status of trust protectors and describes their powers
and duties with some specificity is highly desirable.
C. Potential Uses of Trust Protectors
Although trust protectors are probably most useful when they exercise
narrowly defined powers, settlors can give them a wide variety of powers
and responsibilities. For example, trust protectors can supervise the trustees
of family trusts, particularly when the trustees are not financially sophisti-
cated.5 2 In addition, settlors can give trust protectors the power to modify
trust terms in response to changing conditions in situations involving dynas-
ty, special purpose, or supplemental needs trusts; settlors may also use them
to oversee honorary trusts for animals; and with proper statutory authoriza-
tion, settlors might even give them the power to modify the terms of chari-
table trusts.5 3 Settlors also may use trust protectors to advise or oversee cor-
porate fiduciaries in exercising discretionary powers.54 Finally, in an era in
which the ownership of many banks changes constantly, another benefit of a
trust protector is to provide some stability and continuity in the administer-
ing of the trust.
Estate planners and other practitioners should exercise caution when
providing for trust protectors in their trust instruments because of some dis-
advantages to using trust protectors. Perhaps the greatest concern is that the
use of trust protectors will increase the agency costs of trust administra-
tion. 5 While this complication might not matter when the settlor's and the
51See infra Part V.
52 See infra Part V.B.
5See infra Part V.D-H.
See infra Part V.C.
5 According to Professor Robert Sitkoff, agency costs are "the sum of the costs of the
principal's 'monitoring expenditures,' the costs of the agent's 'bonding expenditures,' and
the 'residual loss' as measured by the reduction of welfare experienced by the principal' as
the result of the divergence in the principal's and the agent's interests." Sitkoff, supra note 3,
at 637 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976)). These
agency costs can arise when the interests of the principal and the agent are misaligned. See
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beneficiaries' interests are aligned, it will increase agency costs when their
interests are not.56
Furthermore, introducing trust protectors into the existing trust law
framework may create a situation where the trustee becomes the de facto
agent of the trust protector rather than being the agent of the settlor or the
beneficiaries.57 This situation is a particular concern if the settlor gives the
trust protector extensive power over the administration of the trust.58 A third
problem is that introducing trust protectors may create "an inefficient diffu-
sion of responsibility., 59 According to Professor Sterk, the trustee may ex-
ercise less care in making investment or distribution decisions if he expects
the trust protector to review them, while the trust protector may rely too
heavily on the trustee to make these determinations and fail to exercise in-
dependent judgment. 0 Finally, when choosing a trust protector, settlors face
the problem of finding one who will be honest, competent, and reliable. As
in the case of trustees, choosing the wrong person to act as trust protector
could be harmful to the trust and its beneficiaries.
id. In such cases, the agent's performance on behalf of his principal may not be as zealous as
the principal would like. Professor Sitkoff refers to this problem as shirking. See id. at 635-
37. Because of information asymmetry between principal and agent, the principal must spend
resources on monitoring costs to prevent shirking by the agent. See id.
Professor Sitkoff has applied an agency cost analysis to trusts and concluded that
problems of shirking and monitoring are often found in trust administration, and therefore,
significant agency costs are likely to occur in connection with the administration of private
trusts. See id. at 623. Where trusts are concerned, these agency costs will primarily consist of
the additional fees and expenses that trustees will generate to comply with increased
accountability requirements. See id. at 635-37. However, they may also include more
intangible costs such as administrative inefficiency. Professor Sitkoff has acknowledged that
the appointment of a trust protector might give rise to additional agency costs because the
appointment creates a series of new relationships, namely settlor-protector, trustee-protector
and beneficiary-protector, but concluded that "the net reduction in agency costs is likely to
outweigh these costs." Id. at 671. More recently, however, Professor Stewart Sterk has
observed that the trust protector is also an agent and that this agency status generates new
forms of agency costs. See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2773. In addition, Professor Gregory
Alexander has concluded that introducing trust protectors into trust administration
complicates existing problems when determining who is the agent and who is the principal in
these new relationships-the settlor, the beneficiaries, or both. See Alexander, supra note 7, at
2808.
56 See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2808-09.
57 See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2777.
See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2811.
59 Sterk, supra note 10, at 2778.
See id
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III. POWERS EXERCISABLE BY A TRUST PROTECTOR
A settlor has almost no limit to the types of powers that he may author-
ize a trust protector to exercise. Generally, settlors may appoint trust pro-
tectors to: (1) advise trustees, (2) supervise the actions of trustees, (3) direct
or veto distributions of trust income or principal, (4) arbitrate disputes
among beneficiaries or between beneficiaries and the trustee, and (5) modi-
fy the provisions of the trust instrument in response to changing external
conditions.
A. Advising Trustees
Traditionally, settlors have appointed trust advisors to provide financial
advice to trustees or appointed cotrustees with separate responsibilities.
However, settlors may also appoint trust protectors to advise the trustee
about investment decisions or about discretionary distributions to beneficia-
ries. If the trustee is a bank or trust company, it probably already will have
access to in-house financial advisors. On the other hand, if the trustee is not
financially sophisticated, the settlor may prefer to appoint a trust protector
with expertise in financial matters to provide advice, particularly if the trust-
ee will receive other powers as well. A trust protector also can advise the
trustee on matters concerning discretionary distributions to beneficiaries.
For example, a family member who is familiar with the character and finan-
cial condition of the beneficiaries of a family trust may be able to provide
useful information or advice to an institutional trustee about potential distri-
butions. Where an educational, support, or special needs trust is involved, a
trust protector may be able to advise the trustee about whether the trustee
should distribute trust funds to the beneficiary and, if so, how much the dis-
tribution should be. Corporate fiduciaries may be uncomfortable making
discretionary distributions to beneficiaries on their own. Making these deci-
sions with the support of a disinterested third party may make this task
somewhat easier for a bank or trust company. Finally, when a state requires
trustees to notify certain qualified beneficiaries of their potential interest in
a trust,61 a settlor may wish to authorize the trust protector to provide direc-
tion to the trustee regarding notification of qualified beneficiaries as re-
quired by statute.
B. Supervising Trustees
If the settlor is concerned that the trustee is inexperienced in financial
affairs or may in the future be less able to manage the trust's property prop-
61 See T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1595, 1608 (2007)
(quoting Taylor v. Nationsbank, 481 S.E.2d 358, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)).
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erly, he should consider appointing a trust protector and vest him with the
power to oversee the trustee's actions.62 Although institutional trustees can
obtain professional investment advice when necessary, in some cases the
settlor might want to establish an additional system of checks and balances,
particularly if the principal asset of the trust is unique property such as a
small business, real property, or art collection.63 If the settlor is concerned
that the trustee will be incapable of making intelligent investment decisions,
he may wish to appoint a trust protector with the power to direct or veto the
trustee's investment decisions.i
One of the most important powers that a settlor can give a trust protec-
tor is the power to remove a trustee, cotrustee, or successor trustee and to
appoint a replacement.65 Settlors often give trust protectors this power in
connection with foreign asset protection trusts to defeat attempts by Ameri-
can courts to order trustees to repatriate trust assets.6 However, this power
may be useful for ordinary domestic trusts by enabling trust protectors to
remove trustees who are not doing a good job of administering the trust. In
addition, the settlor can authorize the trust protector to remove and replace
trustees without court approval when their investment strategies or distribu-
tion policies are inconsistent with the provisions of the trust instrument.67 In
addition, the settlor may authorize the trust protector to exercise the power
of removal when the trustee moves the situs of the trust to a)urisdiction that
requires one or more trustees to be a resident of the state. 8 Finally, if the
trust protector is an attorney or an accountant, the settlor may wish to em-
power him to review and approve accountings of the trustee.69 This provides
some professional oversight over the activities of the trustee and protects
the trust beneficiaries against negligence or misfeasance.70
C. Overseeing Distributions to Trust Beneficiaries
The settlor might authorize the trust protector to direct, consent, or veto
a trustee's action or inaction in making discretionary distributions to benefi-
ciaries.7 1 While leaving the trustee to make decisions about the distribution
62 See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2767.
63 See id at 2770-73.
See id. at 2785.
65 See id. at 2768 n. 36.
See Roder, supra note 36, at 1256.
67 See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2768.
68 See id at 2779.
69 See id. at 2773.
70 See id. at 2768.
71 See id at 2779.
330
Trust Protectors in American Trust Law 331
of trust income or corpus to beneficiaries is normally best, one could envi-
sion a situation in which a corporate fiduciary is primarily concerned with
asset management and may not have much personal knowledge about the
character, maturity, or financial circumstances of the beneficiaries. In such a
case, a nonbeneficiary family member might act as a trust protector and in
that capacity oversee the distribution of trust assets to other family members
who are trust beneficiaries.72
The settlor also may empower the trust protector to change the substan-
tive provisions of the trust, including provisions that affect the rights of trust
beneficiaries.73 For example, a settlor might authorize a trust protector to
add or delete beneficiaries. Settlors sometimes include this power in off-
shore asset protection trusts to protect against creditors' claims.74 However,
this power also might be useful in family trusts to provide for contingencies
such as serious illness, disability, or unexpected financial emergencies on
the part of one of more beneficiaries that are not foreseen at the time of the
trust's creation. The settlor may also wish to empower a trust protector to
increase or decrease any interest of the beneficiaries to the trust, to grant a
power of appointment to one or more trust beneficiaries, or to terminate or
amend an existing power of appointment.
In addition, a settlor may authorize a trust protector to consent to or ve-
to the exercise of a power of appointment. This power might be useful to
guard against the risk that the donee of a general power will make inappro-
priate appointments of trust property. This matter might be of particular
concern to the settlor if the donee is elderly or otherwise susceptible to un-
due influence. Although this issue is less of a problem when the donee has a
special power, because the power to appoint is limited, the settlor might
want to give the trust protector the power to prevent a donee (such as a dot-
ing parent or grandparent) from appointing property to improvident children
or grandchildren.
Finally, the settlor could authorize a trust protector to terminate the trust
prior to its expected date of termination under certain circumstances. Ordi-
narily, the Claflin rule prevents the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
from unilaterally terminating the trust before all trust purposes are fulfilled,
at least if the settlor is dead.76 However, circumstances unforeseen by the
72
See id. at 2779.
See id.
See Roder, supra note 36.
See Sterk, supra note 10, at 2779.
76 See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 337 (1959) (stating that upon consent from all beneficiaries, the trust may be
terminated unless "continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose.").
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settlor may justify terminating the trust prematurely. One solution to the
Claflin doctrine problem is for the settlor to empower a trust protector to
terminate the trust and make a final distribution of trust assets if the costs of
administration threaten to deplete the trust's remaining assets.
D. Resolving Disputes
The settlor also may find it desirable to give the trust protector the pow-
er to interpret the terms of the trust instrument at the request of the trustee
or the beneficiaries.77 In the absence of such a power, the parties may have
to bring an action in court to interpret ambiguities in the trust instrument.78
This process is expensive and potentially avoidable if the trust protector,
assuming that he is either a legal professional or is a close family member,
has the power to interpret the trust instrument in lieu of a court action.
E. Responding to Changes in the Law or Family Circumstances
Tax laws and laws concerning trust administration change over time as
do family circumstances. Therefore, the settlor usually seeks to make the
terms of a testamentary or irrevocable inter vivos trust as flexible as possi-
ble, particularly when the settlor expects the trust to last for a long time.
Traditionally, the settlor does this by vesting the trustee with discretionary
power over the distribution of trust income and principal and, in some cases,
with the power to modify the terms of the trust to take advantage of changes
in the law. A more recent device for adding flexibility to the terms of irrev-
ocable trusts is decanting.80 A decanting provision in the trust instrument
gives the trustee the power to appoint some or all of the trust principal or
income to another trust, provided that the beneficiaries are the same.8 ' A
number of states have enacted statutes that authorize trustees to decant trust
property into another trust.8 2




80 See Alan Halperin & Michelle R. Wandler, Decanting Discretionary Trusts: State
Law and Tax Considerations, 29 TAx MGMT. EST., GiFrs & TR. J. 219 (2004).
81 See William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview
and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 2
(2010); Jeffrey A. Kern & H. Allan Shore, So You Left Your Trust at Home When You Moved
to Florida, 83 FLA. B.J. 55, 57-58 (May 2009).
82 See ALAsKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819 (2005);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 3528 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.04117 (West Supp. 2010);
2009 Nev. Stat. 782 (enacting trust decanting provisions in Chapter 163 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 564B-4-418 (Lexis Nexis Supp. 2009); N.Y.EsT.
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However, an alternative to decanting exists if the settlor does not want
to vest this power in a trustee. Instead, the settlor may require the trustee to
obtain the trust protectors' permission to decant or may vest this power
solely in the trust protector. Furthermore, some state statutes provide that a
settlor may grant a trust protector the power to directly modify the distribu-
tive provisions of a trust under certain circumstances.8 3
In addition, if the trust is a family trust, dynasty trust, or special needs
trust, the settlor can include a provision authorizing the trust protector to
amend or modify the trust instrument to take advantage of any subsequent
changes in the rule against perpetuities; laws relating to restrains on aliena-
tion; or other laws restricting the terms of the trust, the distribution of trust
property, or trust administration. An increasing number of states are chang-
ing their laws to allow settlors to exercise some control over trust assets for
longer periods of time.8
Finally, changes in tax laws or trust administration requirements may
have a significant impact on the financial condition of the trust. Conse-
quently, a settlor should allow the trust protector to move the situs of the
trust from a high-cost state, such as New York or California, to a low-cost
state, such as Nevada or Delaware. The original trustees may not have the
power to change the situs of the trust, or they may be reluctant to do so. A
prudent settlor might authorize the trust protector to take advantage of a
change in situs when the trust protector believes that the circumstances war-
rant such a move.
IV. DUTIES AND POTENTIAL LIABILITIES OF TRUST
PROTECTORS
As Part m points out, trust protectors may be vested with a variety of
powers, either by the settlor or by statute. But what happens if a trust pro-
tector refuses to exercise a power or improperly exercises it? In other
words, should the law treat a trust protector as a fiduciary like a trustee or is
he free to act as he sees fit? Second, if a trust protector owes some duty,
what standard of conduct applies? Is the test due care, good faith, or some
other standard? Third, if a trust protector does exercise his powers as a fidu-
ciary, to whom does he owe a fiduciary duty? Finally, what remedies are
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(b) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 36C-8-816 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-
15-816(b)(27) (2007).
83 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-lB-6(3) (2004 & Supp. 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-710(a)(xi) (2009).
See infra at Part V.F.
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available in such cases to an injured party? Rather surprisingly, only one
appellate court has attempted to answer any of these questions.
A. Robert T McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis
McLean, decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals in 2009, was the
first and only case to consider whether a successor trustee has standing to
sue a trust protector for failing to prevent a former trustee from improperly
depleting trust assets. 5 In 1996, the trust beneficiary, Robert McLean, was
seriously injured in an automobile accident that left him a quadriplegic.86
McLean hired one of the defendants, Michael Ponder, to represent him in
the resulting personal injury lawsuit, and McLean received a large sum of
money when the parties settled.87 In 1999, McLean's grandmother used the
money from the settlement to fund a special needs trust for McLean to sup-
plement the benefits he received from various government assistance pro-
88 89
grams. The trust instrument designated Ponder as the trust protector.
When the original trustees resigned, Ponder exercised his power as trust
protector to appoint Patrick Davis, Daniel Rau, and their law firm, Patrick,
Davis, P.C., as successor trustees.9 According to McLean, he and his attor-
ney notified Ponder in 2000 that the trustees were spending trust funds in-
appropriately. 91 In 2001, Davis resigned, and Ponder appointed Brian Menz
as a successor trustee.92 Ponder then resigned as trust protector and ap-
pointed Tim Gilmore as his successor.9 3 Menz resigned as trustee in 2002,
and Linda McLean, the beneficiary's mother, was appointed to replace
Menz as trustee.9" In 2005, Ms. McLean brought suit on behalf of the trust
against Ponder, Gilmore, Davis, Rau, and Menz.9 5
Insofar as Ponder was concerned, the complaint alleged that he
breached his fiduciary duties as trust protector and acted in bad faith.9 6 Spe-
cifically, the plaintiff claimed that the trust protector failed to monitor and
85 See Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009.
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report trust expenditures, failed to prevent the former trustees from acting
against the interests of the beneficiary, and placed his loyalty to the former
trustees above those of the beneficiary. 9 7 The plaintiff also alleged that the
trust protector's failure to monitor the trust enabled the trustees to deplete
trust assets and improperly remove $500,000 from the trust.98 In response,
Ponder asked the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit or, in the alternative, to
grant a summary judgment for the defendant." Finding that the trust protec-
tor had no legal duty to supervise the trustees, the trial court ruled in favor
of the defendant."3
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered whether the de-
fendant had breached any fiduciary duty to the beneficiary.o'0 The appellate
court began its analysis by identifying various elements of a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, (2) breach of a fiduciary duty that arises
out of that relationship, (3) causation, and (4) resulting harm.' 2 The court
declared that to defeat the plaintiffs claim the defendant must prove the
absence of one of these essential elements, and to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment, the defendant must present undisputed facts to negate
one of the elements of the plaintiffs claim.103 In response, the defendant
argued lack of causation because the beneficiary did not have to rely on the
trust protector alone but instead could have petitioned a court of equity to
remove the trustees if the trustees had acted improperly."' In addition, the
defendant contended that neither state law nor the trust agreement imposed
a duty on the trust protector to monitor or supervise the trustees' activi-
ties. 105
Turning to the causation issue, the court observed that the only legal au-
thority the defendant offered to negate the causation requirement was a stat-
ute, since repealed,'" and two cases holding that a beneficiary had standing
See id at 791.
98 See id. at 795.
9See id at 791.
10 See id at 792.
101 See id.
I0 See id. at 792-93.
103 See id at 793.
04 See id.
See id.
106 See Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.190, repealed by L. 2004, H.B. 1511 § A.
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to bring a lawsuit against a trustee.10 7 The court concluded that these cases
did not support the defendant's claim that a beneficiary's failure to sue a
trustee was sufficient to negate the causation element in a cause of action
against a trust protector for breach of fiduciary duty.'0 8 Interestingly, the
court's reasoning, while nominally concerned with causation, seemed to be
more concerned with the duty issue than with causation. In effect, the court
implicitly assumed that by giving the trust protector the power to remove a
trustee, the settlor intended that the trust protector, rather than the benefi-
ciary, would be primarily responsible for monitoring the trustees' behavior
and take whatever action was necessary to protect the interests of the bene-
ficiary. Therefore, the trust protector could not shift this responsibility onto
the beneficiary by claiming that the beneficiary should have had a court re-
move the guilty trustee.
Addressing the duty issue more explicitly, the court observed that a du-
ty to another could: (1) be imposed by statute, (2) arise out of a prior rela-
tionship between the parties or from a set of circumstances that required one
party to exercise due care to avoid injury to the other, or (3) be assumed by
a party by contract or express agreement. " Since no statute imposed any
duties on a trust protector, the court went on to consider whether some sort
of duty might have arisen from the relationship between the trust protector
and the trustees or from the language of the trust agreement itself.o"0 The
court pointed out that the language of the trust agreement did not specify
how the settlor expected the trust protector to exercise his powers; however,
the court concluded that the agreement did confer these powers to the trust
protector in a fiduciary capacity."'
This conclusion led the court to then consider what standard of care was
applicable to a trust protector who acted in a fiduciary capacity.112 First, the
court declared that one could be held liable if he was negligent in the per-
formance of a fiduciary duty.113 At the very least, the court concluded, a
fiduciary owed a duty of trust, confidence, candor, and good faith.114 In this
case the trust instrument, which declared that the trust protector would "not
107 See Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Trust v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009) (citing Deutsch v. Wolff, 994 S.W.2d 561, 566-67 (Mo. 1999); Siefert v.
Leonhardt, 975 S.W.2d 489, 492-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
108 See McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 793.
10See id.




114 See id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004)).
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be liable for any action taken in good faith," reinforced the good faith stan-
dard." 5 According to the court, this instrument suggested that the trust pro-
tector could be held liable for actions that he took in bad faith. 116 The plain-
tiff could argue that the trust protector had a duty to supervise the actions of
the trustees and remove them for misconduct, with failure to do so being
bad faith." 7 Consequently, the court concluded that because the exact na-
ture of the trust protector's duties and responsibilities were in dispute, the
trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment." 8
In addition, the court observed that another issue of material fact had
not yet been resolved: namely, to whom did the trust protector owe this fi-
duciary duty of good faith? The plaintiff assumed that the trust protector
owed a fiduciary duty to her son, the beneficiary."'9 The court, however,
suggested that language in the trust instrument that declared that it was to
"'constitute a plan for the financial management of the trust estate' might
be construed to mean that the trust protector owed a fiduciary duty to the
trust as a separate entity rather than to the beneficiary.120 The fact that the
successor trustee brought suit against the trust protector in the name of the
trust and not in the name of the beneficiary also may have supported this
conclusion. In any event, the court did not attempt to answer this question,
instead leaving it for the trial court to resolve.121 In this case, a suit in the
name of the beneficiary probably would not have mattered because McLean
was the sole beneficiary of the trust and, thus, the only person who suffered
harm when the trust's assets were depleted.
15Id.
116 See id. at 795.
117 See id. at 794-95.
118 See id. at 794.
See id
120 Id. Although a trust is often thought of as relationships among and between the
grantor, beneficiaries, and trustee, Scott and Ascher on Trusts suggests that the trust is also
something in of itself. "It seems proper, therefore, to define the trust either as a relationship
with certain characteristics or perhaps as a legal institution involving such a relationship." 1
AuSTIN W. Scor, WILLIAM F. FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCoTr AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS, § 2.1.4 (5th ed. 2006).
121 See McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 794.
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B. In What Situations Should a Trust Protector Be Considered a
Fiduciary?
This question was central in McLean.122 As the court in McLean pointed
out, a number of places exist to look for an answer. 123 The first is a statute
that either imposes a mandatory rule that a trust protector be treated as a
fiduciary or, more likely, sets forth a default rule that mandates fiduciary
treatment unless the settlor provides otherwise.124 As mentioned earlier, a
number of states recognize trust protectors by statute. However, only three
of these statutes specify whether trust protectors are fiduciaries. The Alaska
and Arizona statutes declare that a trust protector shall not be liable as a
fiduciary or trustee unless provided for in the trust instrument. 125 This ap-
proach allows the settlor to determine what powers, if any, the trust protec-
tor will exercise in a fiduciary capacity. Michigan's statute, on the other
hand, declares that the trust protector "is a fiduciary to the extent of the
powers, duties, and discretions granted to him under the terms of the
trust"1 26 and further states that "[i]n exercising or refraining from exercising
any power, duty, or discretion, the trust protector shall act in good faith and
in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of
the beneficiaries." 27 However, another provision qualifies this languageby
declaring that the terms of the trust may provide that a trust protector may
exercise certain powers of administration in a nonfiduciary capacity. 128 But
even then, the statute declares that a trust protector must act in good faith.129
Section 808(b) of the UTC provides that "[a] person, other than a bene-
ficiary, who holds a power to direct is presumptively a fiduciary .... "130
The comment to section 808 makes it clear that its provisions can apply to
trust protectors. 13 1 Because section 808(b) uses the word "presumptively," it
suggests that the settlor could elect to relieve the trust protector of his fidu-
ciary duties. 132 Also noteworthy is that section 808(b)'s presumption ex-
122 See id at 793.
123 See id
124 See id.
125 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d) (2008); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818(D) (Supp.
2008).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809(1)(a) (West 2009).
127 Id at § 700.7809(1)(b).
128 See id. at § 700.7809(2).
129 See id.
13 0 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006& Supp.
20O9 See id at § 808 cmt.
132 See id at § 808.
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tends only to the power to direct and does not expressly apply to other pow-
ers.133
In the absence of statutory guidance, the trust instrument should identify
what, if any, fiduciary duties a trust protector owes. As McLean illustrates,
the language of the trust instrument must clearly and completely address
this issue if the parties want to ensure against future litigation. 34 At the
same time, the settlor should realize that each fiduciary duty imposed on a
trust protector creates a corresponding right to seek judicial relief if the per-
son to whom the duty is owed feels the trust protector violated that duty.
Thus, in some cases, imposing fiduciary duties on the trust protector may
actually increase the chances of litigation. The possibility of civil liability
for alleged violations of fiduciary duties might discourage family members
or others from agreeing to serve as trust protectors, particularly if they are
expected to serve without compensation.
C. What Standard of Conduct Applies?
If a trust protector is deemed to be a fiduciary, the next issue is deter-
mining what standard of conduct is applicable. A number of possible ap-
proaches exist: The first one is to hold a trust protector to the same standard
of conduct regardless of the type of power that he exercises. This standard
of conduct could be reasonable care, good faith and fair dealing, and loyal-
ty. Like a trustee, the trust protector's duty of loyalty would prohibit self-
dealing and conflicts of interest, and also impose an affirmative duty of im-
partiality and prudence. Another approach would impose different standards
of conduct, depending on the type of the power that the trust protector exer-
cises. For example, the trust protector might be subject to a good faith stan-
dard when exercising discretionary powers such as removing a trustee, ap-
proving or vetoing the exercise of a power of appointment, changing the
substantive provisions of the trust, making or authorizing discretionary dis-
tributions, changing the situs of the trust, or modifying other trust provi-
sions. On the other hand, a due care or prudent investor standard might be
more appropriate when the trust protector exercises such powers as advising
the trustee about investments or exercising the power to approve or veto the
trustee's investment decisions.
133 See id.
See Robert T. McLean Revocable Trust v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009).
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D. To Whom Does the Trust Protector Owe a Fiduciary Duty?
Imposing fiduciary duties on a trust protector is a meaningless gesture
unless someone has standing to enforce these duties in a court of law. Con-
sequently, determining to whom the trust protector owes a fiduciary duty is
essential. Possible candidates include: (1) the settlor if he is alive, (2) the
trustee, (3) the beneficiaries, or (4) the trust as a separate entity. Statutes
provide little guidance on this issue. As mentioned earlier, the Alaska and
Arizona statutes merely provide that a trust protector is not liable as a fidu-
ciary unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.'35 A Michigan statute
provides that a trust protector is a fiduciary and must act in good faith and
"in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of
the beneficiaries." 36 This language suggests that the trust protector owes a
fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries. However, this language also may
authorize a trustee to sue on behalf of the trust if the trust protector acts in a
way that is inconsistent with "the terms and purposes of the trust."l 37 As
noted in Part C, there are questions whether the trust itself should be treated
similarly to an entity.s38 Finally, section 808 of the UTC provides that cer-
tain persons, including trust protectors, are presumptively fiduciaries and
are required to act in good faith "with regard to the purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries."l 39 This language is similar to that in the
Michigan statute and suggests that both the trust beneficiaries and the trust-
ees may have standing to take legal action against a trust protector who acts
improperly.
Unfortunately, virtually no case law exists on this issue. In McLean, the
plaintiff trustee contended that the trust protector owed a fiduciary duty to
her son, the beneficiary. 14 However, the court pointed out that the trust in-
strument declared that it was to "'constitute a plan for the financial man-
agement of the trust estate,"' thereby suggesting that the trust protector
might owe a fiduciary duty to the trust itself, rather than to the benefi-
ciary.141 Unfortunately, the court in McLean did not provide a definitive
135 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d) (2008); Aliz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818 (Supp.
2008)136 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809(1)(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
137
138 Even if the trust is treated similarly to an entity, presumably either a trustee,
beneficiary, or grantor would have to bring the action on behalf of the trust, calling into
question if there really is any reason to ask whether duties are owed to the trust as an entity.139 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006 & Supp.
See McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 794.
141
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answer to this question, leaving it instead for the trial court to resolve on
remand. 142
E. Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Very little legal authority exists as to what sort of remedies are avail-
able when a trust protector acts--or fails to act-in bad faith or commits
some other breach of fiduciary duty. One would assume that a court of equi-
ty would have the power to compel a trust protector to refrain from acting in
a way that is inconsistent with the provisions of the trust instrument or that
threatens to harm the trust or the interests of the trust beneficiary. Likewise,
a court probably could order a trust protector to exercise an affirmative
power when necessary to carry out an essential trust purpose. Finally, a
court could no doubt remove a trust protector who proved to be dishonest,
incompetent, or unwilling to carry out his duties. In other words, a court of
equity would have the same powers over a trust protector as it currently has
over a trustee.
A more difficult question is whether a trust protector, like a trustee, may
be held liable for financial losses that have resulted from negligence or a
breach of fiduciary duty. Actions that might result in such liability include
making poor investment decisions, failing to monitor the actions of a trust-
ee, authorizing or directing trust assets to improper parties, self-dealing, and
engaging in transactions with a conflict of interest. What little legal authori-
ty exists suggests that trust protectors will be treated like trustees. For ex-
ample, the Michigan statute unequivocally states that "[t]he trust protector
is liable for any loss that results from the breach of his or her fiduciary du-
ties."1 4 3 The statute also limits somewhat the effect of exculpatory clauses
in trust instruments by declaring that "[a] term of a trust that relieves a trust
protector from liability for breach of his or her fiduciary duties is unen-
forceable" to the extent that it "relieves the trust protector of liability for
acts committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of
the trust or the interests of the trust beneficiaries."l44
Whether a court would have the power to surcharge a trust protector, as
is permitted with a trustee, is not clear.145 The only reported case to discuss
the potential tort liability of a trust protector is McLean, discussed above. In
McLean, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's tort
142 See i
143 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809(1)(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
144 Id at § 700.7809(8)(a).
145 If a court could not surcharge a trust protector, the aggrieved party would need to
file a tort claim.
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claim against the trust protector, reasoning that he could be required to
reimburse the trust for any losses caused by his breach of fiduciary duty in
failing to prevent the trustees' improper dispersal of trust funds. '
V. PROVIDING FOR TRUST PROTECTORS IN VARIOUS TYPES OF
TRUSTS
When drafting a trust instrument, the settlor, or his attorney, can define
the trust protector's powers as broadly or narrowly as he chooses.147 Conse-
quently, if the drafter provides for a trust protector in a trust instrument, the
drafter should carefully consider what powers a trust protector must have to
protect the trust beneficiaries and carry out the wishes of the settlor. This
depends on the type of trust involved and the objectives that such a trust is
designed to achieve. This portion of the Article considers what role trust
protectors might play in connection with various types of trusts, including
asset protection trusts, classic family trusts, marital deduction trusts, discre-
tionary trusts, support and special purpose trusts, supplemental needs trusts,
dynasty trusts, honorary trusts for animals, and charitable trusts.
A. Domestic Asset Protection Trusts
Domestic asset protection trusts are usually irrevocable.14 8 Under this
arrangement, the settlor typically retains no beneficial interest in the trust
during the period in which it is irrevocable. 149 Unlike offshore asset protec-
tion trusts, the settlor of a domestic asset protection trust generally does not
need to worry about such things as civil unrest or nationalization of trust
property. 50 Therefore, the principal role of the trust protector is to serve as
an intermediary between the settlor and the trustee. Consider the following
example:
Dr. Green, a 40-year-old orthopedic surgeon, wishes to
put $3 million worth of stocks and bonds into a domestic
asset protection trust. The trust is irrevocable for twenty
years. The trustee is authorized, but not required, to
distribute income and up to 5% of the trust corpus each
year to Dr. Green's children.
See McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 795.See Alexander, supra note 7, at 2810.
148 See Mo. STAT. ANN. § 456.5-505(3) (West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(2)(a)
(LexisNexis 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(10)(ii) (2003 & Supp. 2009).
149 See Wagenfeld, supra note 36, at 848.
150 See Lischer, supra note 2, at 515.
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In this example, Dr. Green might want to require the trustee to obtain
the consent of the trust protector before distributing trust income or princip-
al to the children.'51 In addition, Dr. Green might empower the trust protec-
tor to modify the trust in response to changes in the tax laws and authorize
him to appoint a successor trust protector. Dr. Green might also give the
trust protector the power to remove and replace the trustee or to change the
situs of the trust if the situs state repeals or modifies its asset protection sta-
tute in a way that adversely affects the settlor or beneficiary's interests.
B. Traditional Family Trusts
The traditional family trust typically embodies a relatively straightfor-
ward distributive scheme. In most cases, the settlor's surviving spouse will
receive a lifetime income interest in the trust, while the settlor's children
will receive vested remainders. The trust will usually terminate at the death
of the spouse or when all of the surviving children have reached a certain
age. Consider the following example:
Ms. Smith, a wealthy socialite, establishes a trust in
her will. Ms. Smith's residuary estate will make up the
corpus of the trust. Under the terms of the trust, her
surviving spouse will receive income from the trust for
life, and at his death the couple's children will receive the
trust principal in equal shares when the last child reaches
the age of thirty-five. A trust company is named as trustee.
Appointing a trust protector in this case is probably not necessary. A
corporate fiduciary will have access to expert advice about asset manage-
ment decisions and, therefore, having a trust protector to perform the same
function is redundant. Assuming that the surviving spouse is not very
young, the trust is unlikely to last more than twenty years after Ms. Smith's
death. However, if Ms. Smith wants to provide for unforeseen contingen-
cies, she could appoint a trust protector and empower him to amend the trust
if unexpected deaths, disabilities, or changes in tax laws occur.
A different situation may arise if the settlor names as trustee a family
member with little or no asset management experience. In that case, the set-
tlor might want to appoint a trust protector who has financial expertise and
151 This example assumes that Dr. Green is not concerned about the federal transfer tax
implications of this arrangement and also assumes that the law of thetrust situs will treat Dr.
Green's transfer of the stocks and bonds as a completed and nonfraudulent transfer as far as
future creditors are concerned.
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vest him with some power over the management of trust assets. The follow-
ing example illustrates this:
Mr. Jones establishes a trust in his will. His residuary
estate will constitute the corpus of the trust. Under the
terms of the trust, Mr. Jones's surviving children will
receive income from the trust. At the death of the last
child, each of Mr. Jones's grandchildren then living will
receive an equal share of the trust principal. Mr. Jones's
surviving spouse will serve as trustee.
If Mr. Jones's spouse is elderly or has no financial management expe-
rience, he could appoint a trust protector and direct the trust protector to
advise the trustee on investment matters. Mr. Jones might even require the
trustee to obtain the trust protector's consent before making any major in-
vestment decisions. In addition, if some of the grandchildren are young or
financially unsophisticated, the settlor might also give the trust protector the
power to review the trustee's accounts. Finally, Mr. Jones should give the
trust protector the power to appoint a successor trustee if the settlor has not
already named one in the trust instrument.
Finally, if the trustee is also a beneficiary, having the settlor appoint a
nonbeneficiary to act as trust protector may be desirable. Consider this ex-
ample:
Ms. Brown establishes a trust in her will. Ms. Brown's
residuary estate will constitute the corpus of the trust.
Under the terms of the trust, her husband will receive the
income from the trust for his life, and at his death her
children, including Ms. Brown's children by a prior
marriage, will receive the trust corpus. Mr. Brown will
serve as sole trustee.
In this situation, Mr. Brown has a de facto conflict of interest. Any in-
vestment decisions that produce income at the expense of long-term capital
appreciation are likely to generate displeasure on the part of the remainder
beneficiaries, particularly the children by Ms. Brown's prior marriage. If
Ms. Brown insists on naming her husband as trustee, a helpful approach
might be to appoint a trust protector with the power to veto investment deci-
sions, interpret provisions of the trust instrument, and review the trustee's
accounts. This arrangement may head off disputes between the trustee and
the children and reduce the appearance of a conflict of interest for Mr.
Brown.
344
Trust Protectors in American Trust Law 345
C. Discretionary Trusts
The need for a trust protector may be greater if the trustee has the dis-
cretion to direct income from the trust or trust principal to various potential
beneficiaries. Consider the following example:
Mr. Johnson wants to establish a testamentary trust.
His residuary estate will fund the trust. The will gives the
trustee discretion to distribute income from the trust to the
settlor's children until they reach the age of thirty-five. The
children will receive equal shares of the trust corpus when
the last child reaches the age of thirty-five.
Assuming that the trustee is a corporate fiduciary, the primary function
of a trust protector is to arbitrate any disputes that might arise between the
trustee and beneficiaries over discretionary distributions of trust income
and, if necessary, to interpret the provisions of the trust instrument. This
ability hopefully will enable the parties to resolve conflicts without incur-
ring the expense of litigation. On the other hand, if the trustee is a family
member with personal knowledge of the needs of the beneficiaries, the set-
tlor probably has less need to give the trust protector the power to overrule
the trustee's judgment on discretionary distributions.
D. Support Trusts and Special Purpose Trusts
Most support trusts use broad language, such as "comfortable mainte-
nance and support" to define the beneficiary's right to income or principal
from a support trust. For example:
Ms. Gray wants to establish a testamentary trust
funded from her residuary estate. The will provides that the
trustee may distribute as much of the trust's income and
corpus as may be necessary to provide for the comfortable
maintenance and support of her son, James, during his life.
The will further provides that after the death of James,
Harvard University will receive the trust corpus. Ms. Gray
intends to appoint her brother, Robert, as trustee.
This arrangement may result in some awkwardness for Uncle Bob be-
cause James may feel that more money is necessary to provide him with a
comfortable level of support than Bob is willing to distribute from the trust.
In such cases, a trust protector might be able to interpret the trust instrument
for the parties or otherwise act as an "honest broker" when disagreements
such as this arise between a beneficiary and the trustee. Also, as in other
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situations in which a settlor appoints a family member to serve as trustee,
the settlor might prefer to empower a trust protector with financial expertise
to advise the trustee about investment decisions.
The same logic applies to educational and other special purpose trusts.
The trust instrument will sometimes use broad or vague language to de-
scribe the purposes for which trust funds may be spent. For example, sup-
pose a trust authorizes the trustee to pay "all reasonable expenses any of my
children incur while attending an institution of higher learning." John, one
of the settlor's children, wants the trustee to provide funds for him to take
ballet lessons at the Joffrey Ballet School. If the trustee, reacting to pressure
from other beneficiaries, decides that the trust should not pay the cost of
dance lessons, the trust protector might be able to resolve the issue and
thereby avoid resorting to expensive and acrimonious litigation with John.
E. Supplemental Needs Trusts
Supplemental needs trusts are designed to pay for medical and other ex-
penses that patients incur that Medicaid or other government health care
programs do not pay for.152 The effect of supplemental needs payments on
Medicaid eligibility are strict, complex, and subject to change. 153 Therefore,
providing a mechanism for responding to changing Medicaid regulations is
advantageous for the settlor of a supplemental needs trust. Because changes
in Medicaid regulations may affect distributive as well as administrative
provisions of a trust, empowering a trust protector to modify trust provi-
sions when appropriate might be advisable. Of course, the settlor may prefer
to authorize the trustee, rather than the trust protector, to modify the terms
of the trust.
F. Dynasty Trusts
The term "dynasty trust" is commonly applied to trusts that may last
more than one or two generations.l- Traditionally, the rule against perpetu-
152 See generally, Michael A. Bottar, Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Medicaid Liens,
Supplemental Needs Trusts and Personal Injury Recoveries on BehalfofInfants in New York
State Following the Gold Decision, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 175 (2003); Craig P. Goldman,
Render unto Caesar That Which Is Rightfully Caesar's, but Not a Penny More Than You
Have To: Supplemental Needs Trusts in Minnesota, 23 WM. MrfCHELL L. REv. 639 (1997);
Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities, 10 B.U. PuB.
INT. L.J. 91, 99-103 (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2000).
See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA
L. REv. 1303, 1312-16 (2003); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor's Intent, 53
U. KAN. L. REv. 595, 617-20 (2005).
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ities effectively limited the duration of private trusts. 5 However, in recent
years, many states have modified the rule or abrogated it altogether.15 6 Be-
cause dynasty trusts can last a very long time, they can give rise to a variety
of dead hand problems.
Mr. Vanderbilt wants to establish a testamentary trust
funded from his residuary estate, which he expects to be
$200 million. The will provides that his descendants will
receive the income from the trust per stirpes for one
hundred years. At the end of that period, Mr. Vanderbilt's
descendants, then living, shall receive the trust proceeds
per stirpes. Mr. Vanderbilt has named the First National
Bank & Trust Company to serve as trustee.
In this case, appointing a trust protector who can stand in the shoes of
the settlor and respond to changing conditions and family circumstances
might be desirable for Mr. Vanderbilt. To enable the trust protector to meet
these challenges, the settlor should give the trust protector the power to
amend the trust's administrative and substantive trust provisions under cer-
tain circumstances, to appoint a successor trust protector, to remove and
appoint trustees, and to change the situs of the trust or interpret the provi-
sions of the trust in light of changed conditions.
G. Honorary Trusts
Some states now allow persons to create honorary trusts for pet ani-
mals.'5s Under this arrangement, the settlor transfers property, usually at
death, to a third party for the purpose of caring for the pet. However, in
most jurisdictions, the transferee (trustee) is not obliged to use the property
to care for the pet. If the transferee refuses to accept this responsibility, a
resulting trust results and the property reverts to the settlor or the settlor's
155 The rule provides that "'no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."' See CORNELIUS J.
MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 256 (4th
ed. 2005) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed.
942.6See Lischer, supra note 2, at 513-14; Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 373-78 (2005).See Unif. Trust Code § 408 (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 490 (2006 & Supp.
2009); In re Searight's Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); see also Rachel
Hirschfeld, Ensure Your Pet's Future: Estate Planning for Owners and Their Animal
Companions, 9 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 155 (2007).
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estate.'5 8 Furthermore, if the trustee accepts the property and then fails to
take care of the animal, the trust fails and the property reverts to the settlor's
residuary legatees or passes to the remaindermen if there is a gift over. 159
These rules may make sense doctrinally, but they potentially frustrate
the settlor's intent. If a statute or judicial decision permits, the settlor should
be allowed to designate a trust protector with the power to remove and re-
place the designated trustee of an honorary trust if the trustee refuses to
serve or fails to carry out the terms of the trust. The settlor also might spe-
cifically give the trust protector the power to authorize the trustee to expend
trust funds, including part of the trust corpus, for unforeseen and extraordi-
nary medical expenses for the animal.
H. Charitable Trusts
Because charitable trusts are not subject to the rule against perpetuities,
they may last indefinitely. 1 Unfortunately, the passage of time creates a
problem when the original charitable purpose can no longer be carried out
effectively. When this problem occurs, the trustee must request a court to
exercise its powers under the doctrine of cy pres to modify the terms of the
trust. 16 1 However, a better and cheaper approach might be to authorize a
trust protector to exercise a form of private cy pres by terminating the trust
or changing the trust terms when the original charitable purpose can no
longer be carried out.
Another problem with charitable trusts is that it is difficult to prevent
trustees from acting improperly, particularly if the beneficiaries are not
identified.162 In such cases, the settlor does not have standing to take legal
action against the trustees and instead must rely on the state attorney general
to act on behalf of the public. 163 This approach may not be a satisfactory
state of affairs because state attorneys general are not always willing to car-
158 See 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER& MARKL ASCHER,
Scorr & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 12.11 (5th ed. 2006).
See id.
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1959); see also Mary Kay Lundwall,
Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REv.
1341, 1343 (1995); Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities: The Duration of Charitable Trusts and
Foundations, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1074, 1075 (1966).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); Unif. Trust Code § 413
(amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006 & Supp. 2009).162 Perhaps the most flagrant example of trustee misconduct involved the Bishop Estate
in Hawaii. See generally, Symposium, The Bishop Estate Controversy, 21 U. HAw. L. REv.
353 (1999).
163 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
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ry out the settlor's intent.'" Therefore, authorizing the settlor or another
person to act as trust protector and enforce fidcuiary duties against the trus-
tees of charitable trusts when the state attorney general declines to do so
might be better.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of the trust protector has progressed from its dubious ori-
gins in offshore asset protection trusts to an emerging feature of private ex-
press trusts in the United States.165 However, despite the increasing popular-
ity of trust protectors, current law poorly defines their powers and duties
and their legal status is uncertain in many states. These states should enact
statutes to delineate the powers and fiduciary duties of trust protectors.
To encourage this process, the UTC should be revised to provide a
model for states to consider when they enact legislation to address these
issues. As more specifically discussed below, the UTC should specify some
of the powers that a settlor may confer upon a trust protector and adopt
good faith as the minimum standard of conduct expected of a trust protec-
tor. Also, sections 405 and 408 of the UTC should be amended to authorize
the appointment of trust protectors in connection with charitable and honor-
ary trusts.
The UTC should expressly authorize settlors to appoint trust protectors.
At the present time, section 808(b) of the UTC does not mention trust pro-
tectors by name but merely provides that a settlor may authorize a third par-
ty to oversee the trustees' actions and make certain decisions about adminis-
tering the trust. 166 Only in the comment to section 808 does the UTC
identify trust protectors by name or authorize their use in private express
trusts.167 In light of the increasing acceptance of trust protectors in Ameri-
can law, the UTC should authorize the use of trust protectors in a separate
black-letter section.
164 See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 998-99 (2004); Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to
Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405 (c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related
Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
611, 628-29 (2003).
165 See Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 670.
166 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
167 See id. § 808 cmt., 7C U.L.A. 605.
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Besides authorizing settlors to appoint trust protectors,168 the UTC
should identify at least some of the powers that the trust instrument may
assign to a trust protector. This approach would provide guidance to lawyers
and estate planners but still enable them to provide trust protectors with ad-
ditional powers as circumstances warrant. Although a number of state stat-
utes enumerate the powers that trust protectors may exercise, 169 only South
Dakotao7 0 and Wyoming1 provide a truly comprehensive list of these pow-
ers.172 Both South Dakota and Wyoming statutes identify twelve powers,
though not the same twelve.173 Among the powers common to both statutes
are, inter alia, the power to modify the trust instrument to take advantage of
changes in the tax laws;174 to amend the trust instrument to take advantage
of laws governing restraints on alienation, distribution of trust property, and
trust administration; to remove and replace trustees;176 to increase or de-
crease the interests of trust beneficiaries; 177 to appoint a successor trust pro-
tector; to interpret the terms of the trust;179 and to change the situs or gov-
168 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(a) (2008); Alz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10818(A) (Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (2007 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 15-7-501(e) (2009); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7103(n) (2003 & Supp. 2009); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2(9)(iii)(B) (2003 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-1(2)
(2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(2)(e)(iv) (2007); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-71 0(a) (2009).
See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(b) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818 (2005
& Supg. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(6) (2009).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6 (2004 & Supp. 2008).
171 See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a) (2009).
172 See also Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust Watchdog or Expensive
Exotic Pet?, 30 EST. PLAN. 390 (2003) (identifying eleven powers that a settlor may give a
trust protector).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6 (Supp. 2008); See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-
710(a (2009).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(1) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-710a)(i) (2009).
17 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(11) (2004 & Supp. 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-710(a)(ii) (2009).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(4) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-710 a)(vii) (2009).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(3) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-710 a)(xi) (2009).
17 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(8) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-71 0 a)(iii) (2009).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(9) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-710(a)(viii) (2009).
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erning law of the trust.'80 In addition, the UTC should set forth a procedure
for the appointment of a successor trust protector if the ori inal trust protec-
tor resigns, dies, or becomes unable to continue serving.'
The UTC currently declares that trust protectors are presumptively con-
sidered to be fiduciaries. 182 Instead, the UTC should determine whether the
trust protector is a fiduciary and, if so, to whom fiduciary duties are owed
and what standards of conduct are applicable. Because it is not always clear
to whom a fiduciary duty is owed, the UTC should provide that the trust
protector owes duties to the settlor, if he is alive, or to the beneficiaries, if
the settlor is deceased. 183
As to standards of conduct, one approach would be to establish a floor
of good faith for trust protectors, but allow the settlor to impose a higher
level of conduct, similar to that of a trustee. However, a better approach
would be to set forth a default rule that distinguishes between discretionary
acts and those which involve professional expertise and judgment. Under
this approach the UTC could further apply a good faith standard to discre-
tionary acts as a default rule and declare that a trust protector must act pru-
dently or exercise reasonable care when he oversees or directs the trustee's
investment decisions. At the same time, however, the UTC should make it
clear that the settlor is free to define the nature of the trust protector's fidu-
ciary duties and specify to whom these duties are owed.
Trust protectors might also be able to play a useful role in mitigating
problems associated with the administration of charitable trusts.'8 For ex-
ample, section 405 of the UTC could be amended to authorize the settlor to
appoint a trust protector to exercise a private cy pres power by terminating
the trust or by changing the trust terms if the original charitable purpose can
no longer be carried out. This provision also could be amended to allow
another person to act as the trust protector when the testator is dead to en-
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(7) (2004 & Supp. 2008); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-710(a)(v) (2009).
181 This provision would apply only to situations in which the trust instrument failed to
provide for the appointment of a successor trust protector.182 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(d) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 604 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
83 The UTC should provide that a trust protector owes a fiduciary duty to the
beneficiaries when the settlor has appointed a trust protector to protect beneficiaries from
wrongdoing or poor judgment on the part of the trustee. However, in cases where the settlor
does not intend for the trust protector to serve as a check on the trustee, he could provide in
the trust instrument that the trust protector owes a fiduciary duty to the trustee instead, or in
addition to, any duty owed to the beneficiaries.
184 See Stake, supra note 77, at 2818-19.
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force fiduciary duties against the trustees of charitable trusts if the state at-
torney general declines to enforce those duties. Although section 405 al-
ready allows a settlor to maintain an action to enforce a charitable trust,'18 it
does not apply to testamentary charitable trusts. In the case of those trusts,
allowing a trust protector to act as a surrogate for the deceased settlor is de-
sirable.
Finally, section 408(b) of the UTC could be amended to provide for the
appointment of trust protectors in connection with honorary trusts. This
provision currently authorizes the settlor (or the probate court) to appoint a
person to enforce the trust or to remove and replace the original trustee if he
refuses to serve or fails to carry out the terms of the trust. 8 6 This person is
essentially a trust protector and should be identified as such.
This Article concludes with some suggested modifications of the UTC
that incorporate the proposals set forth above:
(1) A trust instrument, including one which creates a
charitable trust or an honorary trust for the support of an
animal, may provide for the appointment of a disinterested
third party to act as a trust protector.187 A trust protector is
an individual or committee of individuals appointed
pursuant to the terms of a trust who has the power to
supervise, direct, or take certain actions with respect to the
trust.188
(2) The powers of a trust protector shall be as provided
in the trust instrument and may include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(a) to modify or amend the trust instrument to achieve
favorable tax status or because of changes in the Internal
Revenue Code, state law, or the rulings and regulations
implementing such changes;
(b) to modify or amend the trust instrument to take
advantage of changes in the Rule Against Perpetuities, law
185 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (amended in 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A.486(2006 &
Supp. 2009).See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (amended 2004 & 2005), 7C U.L.A. 490 (2006 &
Supp. 2009).
87 See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(a) (2008). The Alaska statute does not mention
charitable or honorary trusts. See id
188 See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 700.7103(n) (West 2010). The Michigan statute further
declares that trust protectors do not include either settlors or holders of a power of
appointment. See id.
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governing restraints on alienation, or other laws restricting
the terms of the trust, the distribution of trust property, or
the administration of the trust;
(c) to appoint a successor trust protector;
(d) to review and approve the accountings of a trustee;
(e) to change the governing law or principal place of
administration of the trust;
(f) to remove and replace any trust advisor for the
reasons stated in the trust instrument;
(g) to remove a trustee, cotrustee, or successor trustee
and to appoint a replacement;
(h) to interpret the terms of the trust instrument at the
request of the trustee or a beneficiary;
(i) to advise the trustee or cotrustee on matters
concerning any beneficiary;
(j) to direct, consent, or disapprove a trustee's or
cotrustee's action or inaction in making distributions to
beneficiaries;
(k) to increase or decrease any interest of a trust
beneficiary, to grant a power of appointment to one or
more trust beneficiaries, or to terminate or amend any
power of appointment granted by the trust, provided that
no modification, amendment or grant of a power of
appointment may grant a beneficial interest to any person
or class of persons not specifically provided for under the
trust instrument or to the trust protector, the trust
protector's estate or for the benefit of creditors of the trust
protector; 189
(1) to terminate the trust; and
(in) to provide direction to the trustee regarding
notification of trust beneficiaries pursuant to section 813 of
this Code.'9
(3) Except as provided below, a trust protector is a
fiduciary when exercising the powers, duties and
discretions granted to him under the terms of the trust.
(a) Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, the
trust protector shall exercise reasonable care when
189 The above powers are enumerated in Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710(a)(i)-(xi) (2009).1 These additional powers are enumerated in S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-6(5) &
(12) (2004 & Supp. 2008).
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performing routine administrative duties or when
providing professional advice. Unless the trust instrument
provides otherwise, the trust protector shall act in good
faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the
trust and the interests of the beneficiaries when exercising
any other power, duty, or discretionary act.
(b) The trustee shall act in accordance with a trust
protector's exercise of the trust protector's specified
powers and will not be liable for so acting. However, the
trustee shall not act in accordance with a trust protector's
attempted exercise of a power if the exercise would be
contrary to the terms of the trust or if the trust protector's
exercise would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty that
the trust protector owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.'91
Hopefully, the next revision of the UTC will address some of the issues
this Article raises. In the meantime, those states that have already adopted
the UTC or have statutorily recognized trust protectors on their own should
consider adopting some or all of the provisions set forth above.
1 This subsection is based on MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7809 (1)-(4) (West
2010). This provides as a general rule that a trustee is not liable for carrying out a directive
from the trust protector that appears tobe legitimate. However, the trustee would be liable if
he or she carried out an order from the trust protector that was contrary to an express
provision of the trust instrument or an obvious breach of the trust protector's fiduciary duty.
In the latter case, the trustee would also be liable for any loss to the trust caused by carrying
out a trust protector's order. This provision is intended to punish a trustee who is negligent or
who colludes with the trust protector to act against the interest of the beneficiaries.
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